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Summary findings
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1.  INTRODUCTION
Recent  research  on public  and private  ownership  of enterprises  has focused  on
two fundamental  questions:  (i) which  form of ownership  promotes  social welfare  more
effectively  and (ii) why  would  politicians,  who can maintain  political  support  by
subsidizing  state-owned  enterprises,  ever relinquish  control? A growing  body of
empirical  research  has addressed  the first question,  suggesting  that private  firms often
operate  more efficiently  than state-owned  enterprises. Less empirical  work has focused
on the second question.  A straightforward  answer,  based upon recent  theoretical  work, is
that politicians  choose  to privatize  when the political  cost of maintaining  state ownership
outweighs  the benefits. However,  it is difficult  to test this proposition  formally.  To do so,
it is necessary  to quantify  the factors  that enter  the politician's  cost-benefit  calculus  and
assess  how are they weighted.
This paper is an attempt  to formally  model,  and test, which  factors  lead policy
makers  to relinquish  control  of state-owned  enterprises.  The privatization  of provincial
banks in Argentina  offers a unique  opportunity  to study the political  economy  of
privatization  in a relatively  homogeneous  institutional  setting  (at least relative  to cross-
country  comparisons)  and for firms  that are relatively  similar. This makes it easier to
assess  the motivations  of politicians  and compare  the performance  of the enterprises
being privatized. The results should  have implications  for both Argentina's  remaining
provincial  banks and for other countries  that  have state-owned  banks frequently  in need
of re-capitalization.  In addition,  some  results  might be able  to be generalized  to state-
owned  enterprises  in other sectors.
2We find that political costs and benefits (as captured in proxies) did have
substantial impact on decisions to privatize.  Those provinces with larger fiscal deficits
and lower-quality banks, frequently in need of re-capitalization through government
subsidies, were quicker to privatize.  Political parties also played a role.  Provinces with
Peronist leaders --  whose support base is, perhaps, tied less closely to those groups that
benefited directly from subsidies to state-owned enterprises -- were also quick to
privatize.
2.  WHY  PRIVATIZE?  THE POLITICAL  ECONOMY  OF  PRIVATIZATION.
Private ownership offers features which should, in many circumstances, ensure
that a private firm operates more efficiently than a similar state-owned enterprise.
Laffont and Tirole (1991) notes, for example, that because managers of public enterprises
own no stock or stock options in their "firms" and are not subject to corporate takeovers
that could cost them their jobs, they typically have less incentive than private managers to
adopt a sufficiently long-term perspective focused on productive efficiency.  That bit of
conventional wisdom breaks down when the state retains control of some of a firm's
shares; in those instances, partial state ownership may be compatible with the disciplining
effect of capital market monitoring.'  Monitoring is, however, one reason to expect
private firms to perform better than state-owned enterprises.  Another is the so-called
hard budget constraint faced by private managers.  Although some public enterprises are,
in fact, shut down, the vast majority expect government subsidy rather than closure in
response to poor perfornance.  Without threat of bankruptcy, public managers have less
incentive to manage well than do their private counterparts. 2
'Holmstrom and Tirole  (1989)  suggests,  however,  that when  the state  retains ownership  of a relatively
large portion  of a privatized  enterprise,  the resulting  market  for its shares  may become  illiquid.
Speculators  may shy away from such shares  thus garbling  the signal about  the firm's future  performance
contained  in its share  price. In those instances,  the disciplining  effect  of capital  market  monitoring  may be
less  effective  than if the firm's shares  were entirely  in private  hands.
2 In addition  to capital  market  monitoring  and hard  budget  constraints,  Laffont  and Tirole  offer three
additional  reasons  why private  ownership  might  be superior  to public: governments  may expropriate
investment  from public  enterprises,  may impose  multiple,  fuzzy,  and changing  objectives  on public
3Laffont and Tirole note that public ownership may, however, offer advantages in
some circumstances.  For example, it may make it easier for a government to pursue
welfare goals other than profit maximization better than it could through regulation of a
private firm.  Theory cannot, therefore, unambiguously resolve which form of ownership
better promotes social welfare.  Recent empirical work has indicated that, in many
instances, privatized firms are more efficient than comparable public enterprises (L6pez-
de-Silanes (forthcoming); Mueller (1989); Vining and Boardman (1992)).  Similarly,
many enterprises exhibit post-privatization improvement in efficiency (Galal et al (1994);
Kikeri, Nellis, and Shirley (1992); La Porta and L6pez-de-Silanes (1997); Megginson,
Nash, and Van Randenborgh (1994); World Bank (1995)).
For the banks in this sample, Clarke and Cull (1997) finds post-privatization
improvements in both loan portfolio quality and the efficiency with which they generate
income.  If provincial policy makers were worried about the health of their financial
sector  -- and a growing body of empirical research suggests a strong link between
financial development and economic growth -- why didn't they privatize more quickly? 3
Shleifer and Vishny  (1994) cites a number of examples that make it clear that politicians
use public enterprises to pursue their own political goals. 4 One straightforward way to do
this is to give redundant jobs at state-owned enterprises to political supporters. 5 State-
owned enterprises may also charge prices below marginal cost to gamer political
managers,  and  may be susceptible  to the pressure  of interest  groups  in directing  those managers. They
note,  however,  that  shareholders  may also expropriate  investment  and  impose  fizzy objectives  on private
managers,  and that governments  may regulate  private  firms so as to appease  interest  groups. It is not,
therefore,  obvious  that these  are important  factors  in favor of private  ownership.
3 See  Levine  (1997) for an excellent  summary  of the literature  on financial  development  and economic
growth. Given  the  substantial  number  of systemic  bank crises  over the past  twenty  years (see  Caprio  and
Klingebiel  (1996)),  even  those provincial  policy  makers  less  concemed  about economic  growth  might  have
preferred  to privatize  their  banks,  if merely  to reduce  the  probability  of disaster.
4 Whether  it be  producing  the  Concorde  rather  than  an aircraft  with  more  mass  appeal  (Anastassopoulos
(1981),  or locating  state-owned  enterprises  in places  that  pleased  Italy's ruling Christian  Democrats
(Martinelli  (1981)),  politicians  have  often  been  willing  to forego  efficiency  to achieve  their  own  goals.
5 Donahue  (1989).
4support. 6 Given  these  benefits,  it seems unlikely  that politicians  would  ever relinquish
government  control. However,  it may be that not all politicians  are alike. Shleifer  and
Vishny  (1994)  suggests  that privatization  occurs  when politicians  who benefit  from low
taxes win out over those who  benefit from subsidizing  supporters.
In addition,  there are a number  of factors  that will affect  the relative  costs and
benefits  of privatization  for all politicians. For example,  L6pez-de-Silanes  et al (1997)
finds  that state  clean government  laws and state laws restricting  public spending
encourage  privatization  at the county  level in the United  States. They suggest  that this
might be because  these laws increase  the cost of political  patronage.! In the same  way,
economic  crises,  which  worsen the fiscal situation  of a government,  might also alter the
costs and benefits  of privatization  making  it more difficult  for politicians,  of all types, to
subsidize  loss-making  state-owned  enterprises  (World  Bank  (1995)). Provincial
governments  facing  large fiscal deficits  might have been  more likely  to privatize  their
provincial  banks than provinces  with sound  finances. 8
It is not immediately  clear,  however,  that deficits should  have a large effect  on a
politician's  decision  to privatize. If a politician  can benefit from privatization  during  a
crisis  period,  it is not clear why he wouldn't benefit during  a non-crisis  period. One
plausible  explanation  might be that distortionary  taxes make  the cost of raising  revenue
higher during  a crisis (when  marginal  rates have  to be higher)  than during  a non-crisis
period. In addition,  crises  might affect  political  players  differently. Less averse  to
raising  taxes,  left-wing  'subsidizing' politicians  might be less affected  by crises  than
fiscally conservative  'low tax' politicians. World Bank (1995)  cautions  that in cases
where  the beneficiaries  of the state-owned  enterprise  status  quo are an important  part of
6 See  Bates  (1981)  on food  pricing  policies  in Africa.
7 However,  they  also  note  that  these  laws  might  simply  be "nuisance  laws"  which  increase  the  cost  of
public  provisions.
8 It is also  possible  that  some provinces  had low  deficits  because  of better access  to federal  subsidies  rather
than sound  finances  per se.
5the leadership's  support  base, "a crisis  must be extremely  large before  the political
benefits  of reform  outweigh  the costs."'
The rationale  for including  bank quality  is similar  to the rationale  for including
deficits.  Poorly  performing  banks impose  a larger fiscal burden  on a government,  which
weakens  the support  base of politicians  that oppose  privatization. Bank  failure,
moreover,  may be a source  not only of substantial  fiscal burden,  but also may  call
taxpayers' attention  to the way capital  is allocated  to members  of the politicians' support
base. This may strengthen  support  for those politicians  that favor  lower  taxes, and thus
increase  the likelihood  of privatization. However,  like deficits,  bank quality  may not
explain much  additional  variation  in privatization  decisions  when  one controls  for
political  party. Subsidizing  a failing  bank is, after all, only one piece of the fiscal  puzzle,
and deficits are already controlled  for in the models  that follow. Further,  the performance
of state-owned  enterprises  can presumably  be hidden  from taxpayers. However,  if low
bank quality  provides  a signal  for thefuture fiscal costs  of refusing  to privatize,  then it
may  provide  additional  information.
We might expect  the political  variables  to explain more  of the variation  in
privatization  decisions  than the other  variable  types. Citing  a number  of examples,
Shleifer  and Vishny  conclude,  "privatization  usually  occurs  when conservative
governments,  favored  by taxpayers,  replace  leftists  governments,  favored  by public
employees."'°  In Argentina,  President  Menem's party, the Partido  Justicialista  (PJ), are
seen as fiscally  conservative,  whereas  the Union  Civica  Radical  (UCR)  are seen as
moderately  left-wing." We would  expect  that provinces  controlled  by the PJ would,
9 In addition,  economic  crises  may affect  the fiscal  situation  of all provinces  in  the same  way.  Lack of
cross-sectional  variation  may be another  reason  that  deficits  do not have a large  impact  on the speed at
which  provinces  privatize  their banks.
10  Shleifer  and Vishny  (1994),  p. 1022.
1 This  has not always  been  true. The Movimiento  Nacionalista  Justicialista  (MNJ),  the predecessor  of the
Partido  Justicialista,  grew out of the radical  nationalist  'Peronista' or 'Laborista'  movement  led by General
Peron. In the mid-1980s  the revived  movement  split into  two factions,  the oficialistas  and the reformist
renovadores.  The  two sides  presented  separate  lists,  in conjunction  with smaller  parties,  in 1985  legislative
6therefore,  be more likely  to privatize  their banks. Provinces  where  the UCR either  is in
control  or has sufficient  support  to block PJ actions should  be slower  to privatize. These
provincial  leadership  variables  also allow us to test whether  the two parties  respond
differently  to deficits. To the extent  that the PJ represents  taxpayer  interests,  we might
expect  provinces  with both high deficits  and PJ leadership  to be especially  likely  to
privatize  their banks.
Finally,  a term limit variable  allows  us to test some  additional  hypotheses
regarding  the political  costs and benefits  of privatization.  Besley  and Case (1995)  finds
that gubernatorial  term limits  in the United  States  have a significant  effect  on economic
policy  choices.  Based  upon a model  of political  reputation  presented  in Banks  and
Sundaram  (1993),  they suggest  that effort,  and thus policy outcomes,  will be different
when term limits  are binding. In the theoretical  model, incumbents  are more willing  to
apply extra effort  (e.  take costly  actions)  if they can be re-elected. However,  as Besley
and Case (1995)  notes "predicting  which  policies  actually  get chosen  requires  an
understanding  of how  enacting  them enters  the incumbents'  probability  of re-election."
(Besley  and Case (1995),  p.794). In Argentina,  PJ governors  might have felt that the
public  elected  them to improve  the fiscal  position  of the provincial  government  and so
might support  privatization  of loss-making  enterprises  for this reason. UCR  governors
might  have felt the reverse. PJ govemors  who  could be re-elected  might be more  willing
to fight for privatization  than other  PJ governors,  whereas  UCR governors  who could be
re-elected  might be more willing  to fight against  privatization." 2
balloting  and  then  in 1987,  the  oficialista  Vincente  Saadi  resigned  as Justicialista  president  following  the
poor  performance  of oficialistas  in  the 1987  legislative  elections. This  paved the way for Carlos  Saul
Menem,  a renovadore  leader,  to become  party  president. In 1989, Menem  was elected  President  of
Argentina.
12 Unfortunately,  since  we  were  unable  to get  data  on  term  limits  for  each  province,  including  this  variable
reduces  sample  size considerably.  For this reason  we omit  this variable  from much of the analysis.
73.  PROVINCIAL  BANK  PRIVATIZATION  IN ARGENTINA
3.1.  Background
At the beginning  of the decade,  each  Argentine  province  owned at least one bank.
The performance  of these publicly-owned  provincial  banks in the 1990s  has been
substantially  worse  than that of private  banks, and  the losses  they incurred  imposed
substantial  fiscal costs  upon the provinces.' 3 Beginning  in 1991,  when the provincial
government  of Corrientes  passed  a law authorizing  the privatization  of Banco de
Corrientes,  provincial  governments  started  to consider  privatizing  the public banks. The
trickle of provincial  bank privatizations  became  a flood  after the "Tequila  Crisis"  of
December  1994. Of the nearly  thirty provincial  banks,  almost  half had been privatized  by
the end of 1996,  and several  other privatizations  had been  authorized  but not completed.
Although  other players,  for example  the Federal  Government  of Argentina,  the Central
Bank of Argentina  and international  donors,  might be able to indirectly  influence  the
privatization  decision,  the final choice is made by the provincial  government.  This
allows  variation  along several  key dimensions,  including  fiscal performance  of the
province,  bank performance  and the political  incentives  facing  key players,  while keeping
other institutional  details similar.
3.2. Variable  Descriptions  and Summary  Statistics
In this section,  we describe  and provide  summary  statistics  for variables  that
might have affected  the incentives  and constraints  facing  decision-makers  in the
provincial  governments. We include  variables  indicating  whether  opponents  could  block
privatization  in either  the executive  or legislative  branch  of government;  bank quality
variables  indicating  the cost of continuing  to support  the public  provincial  bank; a fiscal
deficit variable  indicating  the province's  ability to support  money-losing  enterprises;  and
a term-limit  variable  to capture  the governor's  incentives  to take costly actions.
13 See Clarke  and Cull (1997)  for a description  of the performance  of public  and privatized  provincial
banks  in Argentina.
81.  Provincial Politics.  As noted, President Menem's party, the PJ, is often seen as more
fiscally conservative, and more sympathetic towards privatization, than other parties.
The model includes two dummy variables, one indicating whether the PJ controlled
both the provincial congress and the governorship and another indicating whether
either the Union Civica Radical (UCR) or another single party could block
privatization at either the legislative or executive level." 4 In practice, when a party
other than the PJ has a majority in either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, the
governor also belongs to that party.  The "omitted" category is therefore provincial
governments with a PJ governor where the PJ does not have a majority in both
legislative chambers.  These variables indicate whether a single opposition party, or a
coalition of opposition parties, control an executive or legislative veto point."
Table 1: Median Deficits as Share of Revenues for 1992
Group  No. of  Deficits  as Share
Banks  of Revenues
Bank  Privatization  Process  Started  Prior to Dec. 1994  4  0.0487
Bank Privatization  Process  Started  After Dec. 1994  13  0.0480
Bank  Privatization  Process  Not Started  By Dec. 1996.  7  0.0513
14  In provinces  with  both  a Chamber  of Deputies  and a Senate,  PJ control  implies  that  the  PJ  has  majorities
in both  the  Chamber  and  the  Senate.  Since  in bicameral  legislatures,  opposition  parties  could  block
privatization  with  control  of only  one  chamber,  the  blocking  variable  indicates  that  an opposition  party  has
control  of at least one of the houses. From  this point  onwards,  for ease of exposition,  we shall write  as if
all  provinces  had  two  houses.  For  unicameral  legislatures,  the  omitted  category  is provinces  with  a PJ
governor  where  no party has a majority  in the chamber  of deputies. For bicameral  legislatures,  the omitted
category  is provinces  with  a PJ governor  where  either  the PJ has a majority  in one chamber  and no party
has a majority  in the other, or where  no party has a majority  in either chamber.
15  See,  for example,  Cox and McCubbins  (1996).
92.  Government  Deficit. As noted earlier,  economic  crises,  which  make it more difficult
for the government  to subsidize  loss-
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Figure  1: Median  Deficit  as %  of Revenues.
thlose  that did not privatize  at all.'1 6
However,  in the econometric  analysis,  after controlling  for the political  and bank
performance  variables,  we do find that high fiscal deficits  (as a percentage  of
revenues)  increased  the probability  of privatization. This result may be primarily
caused  by time series  variation  in deficits. Figure 1 shows  that the median  provincial
deficits  varied greatly  over this period (from  4.5% of revenues  in 1996  to 17%  in
1995).
3.  Bank Quality  Variables. Several  measures  of bank performance  are included  in the
model. A poorly performing  public  provincial  bank could impose  high fiscal  costs
upon a province  -- those  provinces  with the worst  performing  banks  might have  been
unwilling,  or unable,  to subsidize  the banks  for political  reasons. Table  2 shows  that
banks that were privatized  earlier  (banks  who started  the privatization  process  before
the Tequila  Crisis of December  1994)  tended  to be worse  performers  in 1992 (prior  to
16 We used 1992  fiscal  data because  we want  to compare  deficits  prior to any privatizations.  This is
important  because  the act of privatization  might  affect  the provinces'  deficits  (for example  by ending  the
need  to finance  recapitalization  of the provincial  banks).
10privatization) than those privatized later or not all.  Likewise, late privatizers appeared
to have been performing less well in 1992 than those not privatized at all.
Table 2: Median  1992  Performance  Indicators  for Early,  Late and Non-Privatized
Provincial  Banks
Group  No.  of  Net Worth  "Normal"`  Loans  to  Public
Banks  divided  by  Net  Loans  as Share  Sector  as Share
Liabilities**  of Total  Loans** of Total  Loans**
Privatized Prior to Dec. 1994***  4  0.082  0.474  0.205
Prnatized After Dec. 1994  13  0.191  0.625  0.174
Not Privatized By Dec. 1996.  7  0.217  0.702  0.135
*  "Normal"  Loans  are Loans that  are not overdue.  (See  Table  3)
**  All data is for June 1992  (prior  to any  privatizations).' 7
*** Omits  Corrientes  since  this bank was privatized  in 1991,  and we want pre-privatization  data.
Including  Corrientes  makes all performance  measures  even  worse for early  privatizers.
4.  ECONOMETRIC  RESULTS.
Using Cox's proportional hazard model, the timing of privatization is estimated as
a function of the quality of the provincial bank, the political affiliation of the key
decision-makers, and the fiscal situation of the province.I" The hazard rate in this model -
- which, loosely, is the rate at which banks are privatized after time t given that they were
not privatized prior to time t -- is:'9
A(t)  =  AO(t)  e8x1+  +flkxk
Ao(t) is the "baseline" hazard function, a non-parametric function of time; ,  is the
parameter vector; and x is the vector of covariates (e.g. the bank quality variables). In the
results, a positive coefficient indicates that an increase in that variable increases the
17 The privatization  process  for Corrientes  started in October 1991,  however  this province  is omitted  from
all analysis  due to missing  data in 1990  and 1991.
18  The partial likelihood  model  was first  presented  in Cox, D. (1972) "Regression  Models  and Life
Tables." Journal  of the Royal Statistical  Society  B, 34, pp. 187-220. Other sources  which discuss  this
class  of models  include  Kalbfleisch,  J and Ross  L. Prentice (1980)  The Statistical Analysis of Failure  Time
Data.  New  York: John Wiley  and Sons; and Greene,  W. (1997)  Econometric Analysis 3rd ed New York:
Macmillan.
19  The time  of privatization  is when  the law enabling  privatization  was passed. This  point, which is the
start of a process  which often  lasted  several  years,  is relevant  because  this is when  the political  decision  to
privatize  is being made.
11probability of privatization (increases the privatization rate) -for example, the positive
sign on percent of loans to the public sector indicates that a greater public portfolio
increases the probability of privatization.  A negative sign would indicate the opposite.
The baseline hazard function, a (non-parametric) function of time, allows the probability
that the bank will be privatized to change over time.  This will help control for changes in
national laws or institutions and exogenous shocks that affected the entire banking sector
which (proportionally) affect the privatization decisions of all provinces (e.g. the Tequila
Crisis, changes in reserve requirements, and the new Charter of the Central Bank of
Argentina enacted in September, 1992).
Table 3 describes the variables included in the analysis.  In the estimation, bank
quality variables are lagged one period.  After the decision to privatize was made,
performance indicators, such as net worth and portfolio quality variables, sharply
declined.  Rather than being the result of actual changes in performance, this decline
appears to have been caused by a more careful auditing of bank assets (perhaps intended
to help the province separate the bank into a privatized provincial bank and a residual
entity). 20 Since this auditing occurred only if the bank was privatized, coefficients on
contemporaneous bank quality variables might be negative even if bank performance did
not affect privatization.  To avoid this potential problem, we include lagged, rather than
contemporaneous, bank performance variables. Similarly, since the proceeds from
privatization might affect provincial deficits, we also lag the fiscal deficit variable.
Results from the estimation are shown in Table 5.21  Coefficients on the lagged
bank quality variables are statistically significant (at least at a 5% level).
22 All variables
20  See Clarke and Cull (1997).
21 Several experts suggested that we should omit the Banco de Provincia de Buenos Aires from our sample.
Experts at the Central Bank noted that the 1853 Pacto San Jose de Flores, a pact between the province of
Buenos Aires and the Federal government, which predates the Central Bank, means that the Central Bank
cannot effectively control this bank.  They suggested that this gives this public provincial bank a special
status which makes its privatization unlikely.  Further, several other experts noted that political rivalry
between the Governor of Buenos Aires (Eduardo Duhalde, a member of the PJ) and President Menem
made the Governor less willing to compromise with the President.  However, our results are similar
12confirm that worse performing public provincial banks are more likely to be privatized,
all other things being equal, than better performing banks. The coefficient on net worth
over liabilities is negative, indicating that banks with higher net worth were less likely to
be privatized.  The coefficient on the percent of loans that are not overdue is also
negative.  This indicates bank's with better loan portfolios were less likely to have been
privatized.  The spline, which allows the coefficient to take different values after
definitions concerning loan classification and reserve requirements changed, is
statistically significant with a positive sign. 23 This might indicate that quality of the
portfolio became more important after reserve requirements were tightened. 24 Stricter
reserve requirements after 1994 might have increased the costs that public provincial
banks with poor loan portfolios imposed upon the provinces, increasing the likelihood of
privatization.  Banks with a high percentage of loans to the public sector were more likely
to be privatized than those with lower percentages of loans to the public sector.  This
variable is weakly negatively correlated with the other performance variables - banks
with a high percentage of loans to the public sector  tend to have lower net worth
(correlation of -0.08 in June 1992) and less "normal" loans (-0.27 in June 1992). One
possible reason for this might be that banks with a large public sector loan portfolio made
more politically motivated loans. The change in net worth over liabilities is included to
test whether privatization is more, or less, likely when the performance of the bank is
declining.  Although the negative coefficient indicates that privatization is less likely
whether  Provincia  de Buenos  Aires  is included  or not. Table 6 shows  results  with the Banco de Provincia
de Buenos  Aires  omitted.
22 The independent  variables  in this model  change,  at most, every six months. Government  deficit data is
only available  on a yearly  basis,  bank quality  variables  are available  for June and December  of each year.
23 See Central  Bank of Argentina  (1996). A Wald  test of the null hypothesis  that the sum of the two
coefficients  is zero is rejected  at conventional  levels  (X 2(l) = 5.84).
24 The most significant  definitional  changes  occurred  for different  classifications  of 'bad' loans. It seems
unlikely  that  the slight  definitional  changes  for normal loans drive  this result,  especially  since  the variable
base  hazard rate  might help control  for some of the change. However,  the definitional  changes  make it
impossible  to draw strong  conclusions. See  Bolzico  and Figueroa  (1994)  for a discussion  of the changes  in
definitions  and in reserve  requirements.
13when the bank's performance is improving, it does not approach significance.  Dropping
this variable does not affect results (see Col. (3), Table 5).
Table 3:  Independent  Variables  in the Estimation.
Variable  Comments
Does the PJ control  the  A dummy  variable  indicating  that the Partido  Justicialista  (President
assembly  and the  Menem's party)  controls  both the Governorship  and provincial
executive? (1=yes,  Congress. If the provincial  Congress  is bicameral,  this indicates  that
O=no)  both the Senate  and the Chamber  of Deputies  are controlled  by the PJ.
Can either the UCR or  A dummy  variable  indicating  that the Union Civica  Radical  (UCR) or a
independents  block?  single  independent  party controls  at least one chamber  of the provincial
(1=yes,  O=no)  Congress  or the Governorship.  In practice,  since  when either  the UCR
or a single  independent  party controls  either chamber  the governor also
belongs  to that party, this indicates  that the governor is either a member
of the UCR or an independent  party.
Can UCR block  in the  A dummy  variable  indicating  that the Union Civica Radical  controls  (at
assembly  or the  least one chamber  of) the provincial  Congress  or the Governorship.  In
executive?  (1=yes,  practice,  when  the UCR  controls  either the Chamber  of Deputies  or the
O=no)  Senate,  the governor  also belongs  to that party.
Can independents  A dummy  variable  indicating  that a single  independent  party control
block  in the assembly  either (at least one chamber  of ) the provincial  Congress  or the
or the executive?  Govemorship.  In practice,  when a single  independent  party controls
(1=yes,  O=no)  either the Chamber  of Deputies  or the Senate,  the governor  also
belongs  to that party.
Bank  Net Worth  over  The bank's net worth over its liabilities  (lagged  six months).
Liabilities
% of Bank Loans to  Percent  of the bank's loans made to the public sector  (lagged six
Public Sector  montlis).
% of Bank Loans  Percent of the bank's loans that are not overdue  (lagged  six months).
considered  "normal"  The definition  of bad loans and provisioning  requirements  against bad
(either  definition)  loans changed  in 1994. Therefore,  we include an extra term allowing
the coefficients  on this tern to change when  the definition  changed.
Government  Deficit as  Government  deficit  as percent of total revenues  (lagged  one year).
Share of Revenues  Govemment  deficits are positive  and surpluses  are negative. This is
used, ;rather  than deficit  as share of provincial  GDP because  good
measures  of provincial  GDP were not available.
Change  in Net Worth  The change  in the banks  net worth over its liabilities  (lagged  six
over  Liabilities  months). An increase in net worth is positive.
If the governor  is a  An interaction  term indicating  whether  a PJ governor  could  be re-
member  of the PJ, can  elected for an additional term.
he be re-elected?
(1=Yes,  O=No)
The coefficient on fiscal deficit as a share of revenues is positive and statistically
significant throughout the analysis at least a five percent level.  The positive coefficient
14indicates that provincial governments facing large fiscal deficits are more likely to
privatize their public provincial banks than those facing smaller deficits.  This result is
consistent with findings in World Bank (1995) which suggest that reform is more likely
when the government is facing a fiscal crisis -- provincial governments facing large
deficits are less willing, or able, to subsidize public provincial banks. 25
In general, the hazard rate appears more sensitive to changes in the bank quality
variables than to the provincial deficit (See Table 4). 26  A I% increase in net worth over
liabilities decreases the (unobserved) hazard rates for privatization by 3%, and a 1%
increase in normal loans as a percentage of total loans decreases the hazard rate for
privatization by 4%.27  In contrast, a 1% increase in provincial deficit (as a share of total
revenues) decreases the hazard rate for privatization by less than 1  %.
Table 4: Elasticities  of Estimated  Hazard  Rate  with Respect  to Continuous  Independent
Variables
Elasticity  95% Confidence
Interval
Net worth over liabilities  -3.03**  (-5.27, -0.78)
Public loans as percent  of all loans.  1.08**  (0.13, 2.03)
Total "normal" loans as percent of all loans  -4.37**  (-7.03, -1.71)
Provincial government deficit as percent  of  0.73**  (0.15, 1.31)
revenues
+  Elasticities are calculated at the means of all variables
++  Coefficient estimates are from Table 5, Column 2.
25 World  Bank (1995), Chapter  4.
26 Results  from exponential  and Weibull  hazard  models  are similar  to the results  presented  for the
proportional  hazard model. The main differences  are: in the exponential  hazard  model, the coefficients  on
the share  of loans to the public  sector and on provincial  deficit  as a share of provincial  revenues  drop to a
10%  significance  level. In the Weibull  hazard  model,  the coefficient  on provincial  deficit as share  of
provincial  revenues  becomes  insignificant  at conventional  levels  (but share  of loans to the public  sector
remains  significant  at a 5% level). However,  changes in national  laws and institutions  and exogenous
shocks  such as the Tequila  crisis  make Cox's proportional  hazard  formulation  appear more  attractive  than
the fully  parametric  models  which force  the base  hazard  rate to follow  less  general  time-dependent  paths.
Further,  as noted in footnote  39, hypothesis  tests  appear  to favor Cox's proportional  hazard model  over  the
two fully parametric  models.
27 Elasticities  are calculated  at the means of all variables.
15Of the political variables in Column (1) of Table 5, only the coefficient on
whether independents can block privatization is statistically significant at conventional
levels.  However, the coefficients on the blocking variables for both the UCR and
independents have the expected negative signs -- indicating that if any other party can
block privatization, that outcome becomes less likely -- and have similar magnitudes.  A
Wald test of the null hypothesis that the two coefficients are equal fails to reject the null,
indicating that UCR and independent governors appear equally likely to block
privatization. 28 Column (2) of Table 5 shows results when the coefficients are
constrained to be equal.  The coefficient on the blocking variable is statistically
significant,  indicating that privatization is less likely when the governor is either a
member of the UCR or an independent party. 29 The other political variable, a dummy
indicating that President Menem's Partido Justicialista controls both the provincial
congress and the governorship, is statistically insignificant throughout the analysis. 30
This indicates that privatization is no more or less likely with a PJ governor and a PJ
majority in (both houses of) the provincial congress, than when there is a PJ governor but
no PJ majority in (both houses of) the legislature. 3 '  The point estimate of the effect on
the hazard rate of an independent or UCR governor is 0.16  - indicating that the rate at
which public provincial banks are privatized with an independent or UCR governor is
approximately one sixth the rate with a PJ governor. 32
In Column (4) of Table 5 we include an interaction term between the government
deficit variable and whether the UCR or another independent party can block
28 The X 2(1) statistic is 0.02.
29 A test of the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that the PJ controls
both the legislature and the executive is equal to the coefficient on the dummy variable indicating that
either the UCR or independent party can block is rejected at a 5% significance level.
30 Results are similar in terms of both size and statistical significance when this variable is omitted.
31 Recalling that if there is not a PJ governor then the dummy variable indicating that either the UCR or an
independent party can block is one.  There were no cases where the UCR or a single independent party
controlled the provincial legislature and the governor was either PJ or a member of a different party.
32 However, the 95% confidence interval is quite large (0.03 to 0.82).
16privatization. 33 The coefficient is negative but statistically insignificant --  the large
negative coefficient might indicate that only PJ governors are affected by provincial
deficits (i.e. we are unable to reject the null hypothesis that the sum of the deficits and
interaction coefficients is zero). However, we are also unable to reject the null hypothesis
that all governors are affected equally.
Table 5: Proportional Hazard Model for Bank Privatization (Buenos Aires Included)
(1)  1  (2)  1  (3)  1  (4)  1  (5)
Proportional  Hazard  Model  (Monthly  Data)
Prov. de Buenos  Aires  Included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes
# of Banks  23  23  23  23  17
# of Privatizations  16  16  16  16  12
# of Months  at Risk of Privatization  1010  1010  1010  1010  825
Does the PJ control  the assembly  -0.732  -0.625  -0.598  -0.235  -1.935
and the executive?  (l=yes,O=no)  (-0.91)  (-0.78)  (-0.75)  (-0.28)  (-1.45)
Can either UCR  or independents  -1.865**  -1.822**  0.117  -2.055
block?  (1=yes,O=no)  (-2.19)  (-2.19)  (0.09)  (-1.52)
Can  the UCR block in assembly  or  -1.466
executive?  (f=yes,O=no)  (-1.53)
Can independents  block  in assembly  -2.553**
or executive? (1=yes,Ono)  (-1.92)
Bank net worth  over  liabilities  -16.989**  -16.622**  -17.09**  -17.240**  -12.337*
(lagged)  (-2.63)  (-2.64)  (-2.83)  (-2.80)  (-1.90)
% of bank  loans  to  public sector  5.368**  5.645**  5.552**  5.409**  1.400
(lagged)  (2.09)  (2.22)  (2.20)  (2.18)  (0.30)
% of bank  loans  considered  -7.321**  -7.289**  -7.423**  -7.501**  -7.884**
"normal"  (either  definition)  (lagged)  (-3.34)  (-3.22)  (-3.32)  (-3.19)  (-2.61)
% of bank loans  considered  - 2.807**  2.499*  2.514*  2.456*  3.413*
"normal"  (old  definition) (lagged)  (2.04)  (1.90)  (1.90)  (1.77)  (1.89)
Gov't  deficit  as share of revenues  8.016**  8.038**  8.018**  9.525**  8.830**
(lagged)  (2.44)  (2.46)  (2.46)  (2.80)  (2.39)
Gov't  deficit (lagged)  * blocking  -17.552
dummy  (-1.43)
Change in net worth  over  liability  -2.841  -2.080
(lagged)  (-0.35)  (-0.27)
If the  governor  is a member  of the  2.575**
PJ, can he be re-elected?  (2.01)
Log  Likelihood  -25.56  -25.84  -25.88  -24.54  -14.67
t-stats in  parentheses.
* indicates  significance  at 10%  level  ** indicates  significance  at 5% level.
33 We also  included  an interaction  term between  net worth  over  liability  and whether  a non-PJ  party  can
block privatization  in some  estimations  (both including  and omitting  the interaction  term  with the deficit
variable). The coefficient  on the interaction  between  bank performance  and  the blocking  variable  was
negative  but never approached  significance.
17As an additional  test, we include  a dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the
governor  can run for re-election  or not. Laws concerning  this vary from province  to
province  -- some  have  term limits  while others  do not. Unfortunately,  since  vve  were not
able to obtain  details on term limits  for all provinces,  the sample  size is considerably
reduced  which  makes it difficult  to draw strong  conclusions  regarding  this variable. The
coefficient  on the simple  dummy  variable  is positive  but statistically  insignificant. 34
However,  when the variable  indicating  whether  the governor  can be re-elected  is
interacted  with an indicator  that the governor  is a member  of the PJ, the coefficient
becomes  statistically  significant  and  positive (Column  (4), Table  5). Unfortunately,  we
are unable  to include  an interaction  term for UCR or independent  governors  because  there
were no cases  where a province  with a UCR  or independent  governor  who could  be re-
elected  actually  privatized  the public  provincial  bank. Although  this is consistent  with
the hypothesis  that UCR governors  who can be re-elected  are less likely  to privatize  than
other  UCR governors,  we are unable  to test this formally."
The positive  coefficient  on the term limit  interaction  variable  indicates  that
privatization  is more likely  in those  provinces  where  the (PJ) governor  could seek an
additional  term. The coefficient  on the blocking  variable  (indicating  a non-PJ  governor)
becomes  statistically  insignificant  once  the interaction  term is included. The additional
dummy  variable  included  for PJ governors  who can be re-elected  changes  the omitted
category  from PJ governors  who do not have PJ majorities  in both houses  to PJ governors
who can not be re-elected  who do not have PJ majorities  in both houses. Together,  these
results suggest  that only PJ governors  facing  re-election  were more likely  to privatize
than other governors. 36 One  possible  explanation  for this might be that governors  who
can seek re-election  are more  willing  to take politically  costly  actions  than those  who can
34 Results  available  from the authors  upon  request.
35  Since  there were no observed  cases where  a UCR  governor  who faces  re-election  privatized  the public
provincial  bank, the model  tries to make  the coefficient  infinitely  negatively  large so that it predicts  that
opposition  governors  who can be re-elected  will never privatize  public  provincial  banks.
36Once  again  recalling  that, in practice,  whenever  the UCR  or an independent  party  can block, the
governor  is a member  of the UCR  or opposition  party.
18not. Another  plausible  explanation  is that only governors  who  can be re-elected  can fully
internalize  the benefits of privatization. If the costs of privatization  (i.e. closing  branches
and  realizing  past losses)  are immediate,  whereas  the benefits  come over time,  then
politicians  with short  time horizons  might be unwilling  to privatize. Other  than the
coefficient  on the share  of loans made  to the public sector,  the other coefficients  remain
statistically  significant  at at least a 10% level.
As a final exercise,  Figure  2 shows  the estimates  of the base hazard  rate for each
period when at least one bank was
Base  Hazard  Rate  for Privatization  privatized.  37 Essentially this is the
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Figure  2: Base  Hazard  Rate.  strong  conclusions  based  upon
Figure  2, the figure  suggests  that after  controlling  for bank quality,  provincial  fiscal
deficit and political  affiliation  of the governor  and legislature,  privatizations  appear  more
likely  after mid 1995.39 One  possible  explanation  for this is the Tequila  crisis of
37 Estimates  are only  for those  months  when at least  one bank was privatized.
38 Technically,  it is the rate at which  surviving  public  provincial  banks  would  be privatized  if all
independent  variables  were set to zero.
39  Two additional  pieces  of evidence  suggest  that the base  hazard  rate is not constant. First, when  we
estimate  the model  with  aWeibull base hazard  rate, we reject the null hypotheses  that  the base hazard  rate
is flat or monotonically  decreasing.  The fully  parametric  Weibull  model,  a special  form of the proportional
hazard model  with  base hazard  rate 2,_(t)  =  p tP-', has a monotonically  increasing  base  hazard rate if p is
greater  than  one, monotonically  decreasing  base  hazard  rate if p is less than one,  and a flat base  hazard  rate
if p is equal  to one. The point estimate  of p from our model  is greater  than one,  and the null hypothesis
that it is equal  to one can be rejected  at conventional  significance  levels. Second,  as Kalbfleisch  and
Prentice(1980,  p.32)  note the exponential  hazard  model  is also a special  case of the proportional  hazards
19December 1994. Many public provincial banks lost substantial deposits immediately
following the crisis.40 The resulting liquidity crunch might have changed the political
calculations regarding bank privatization for provincial politicians.  Aside from
highlighting the weaknesses inherent in public provincial banks' operations, the crisis
may have enabled providers of liquidity (i.e., the Central Bank and the World Bank) to
impose pressure upon the provinces to privatize. This result is consistent with the
hypothesis that exogenous shocks makes privatization more attractive. 41 Another
plausible explanation is that provinces' decisions were influenced by privatization
outcomes in other provinces. As the number of privatized provincial banks increased,
pressure to privatize surviving public provincial banks might also have increased. 42
5.  CONCLUSION.
The main findings from the empirical section of the paper are:
1.  Peronist (PJ) governors were, in general, far more likely to privatize their province's
public provincial bank than governors who belonged the Union Civica Radical (UCR)
party or other independent or regional parties.  The estimated hazard rate for Peronist
governors was six times the estimated hazard rate for governors from other parties.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that fiscally conservative politicians are
more likely to privatize than other politicians.
model  with a constant  base  hazard  rate (X 0= X).  The maximum  likelihood  estimator  of the exponential
hazard  model  will be efficient  and consistent  if the base  hazard is constant  over the entire period,  while  the
partial  likelihood  Cox estimator  will be consistent  whether  or not the base  hazard  is constant  over  the entire
period,  although  it is not fully efficient. A Hausman(1980)-type  test comparing  the parameter  estimates
from the two  models  (for  the model  shown  in Table  5, Column  (2)) yields  a X 2(8) statistic  of 234.8. On
that basis,  we reject the null hypothesis  that  the base  hazard  rate is constant. (A similar  test for the Weibull
model  rejects  this model  in favor of the proportional  hazards  model  at conventional  significance  levels  as
well). As noted in footnote  26, parameter  estimates  from both  the Weibull  and exponential  models  are
similar  to the parameter  estimates  from  the general  proportional  hazard model.
40 As noted in Clarke and Cull(1997),  the bank quality  variables  used in this section  do not reflect  the
significant  deposit  losses suffered  by many poorly  performing  banks  especially  well. This  might  mean  that
the crisis  increased  the cost of not privatizing,  in a way not captured  by the included  bank performance
variables.
41 World  Bank (1995),  Chapter  4.
42 Unfortunately,  we are unable  to test these  hypotheses  since  only  variables  that  differ across  banks  in any
given time  period  can be included  in the regression.
202.  Poor quality public provincial banks were more likely to be privatized than better
performing banks.  This result appears quite robust across different specifications and
to different measures of bank performance.  Further, the probability of privatization
appears to be extremely sensitive to bank performance. A 1% increase in net worth
decreases the estimated privatization rate by 3%, while a 1% increase in the number
of 'normal'  (i.e. non-overdue) loans (as percent of total loan portfolio) decreases the
estimated privatization rate by 4%. (See Table 4).
3.  Controlling for bank quality and for the political affiliation of key government
players, provinces in tight fiscal situations appear more likely to privatize their public
provincial banks. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that exogenous fiscal
crises can encourage privatization."  However, the probability of privatization does
not appear to respond as strongly to poor fiscal performance as it does to poor bank
quality.
4.  The probability that provinces would decide to privatize remaining public provincial
banks appears to have increased over time, after controlling for the other variables in
the analysis. Although it is impossible to draw strong conclusions as to why this
occurred, possible reasons include that either (i) the Tequila crisis of December 1994
or tougher provisioning requirements and supervision increased the costs that public
provincial banks imposed on the provinces or (ii) political pressure on provinces who
had not privatized increased as privatization became more widespread.
This paper demonstrates that political incentives play an important role in the
timing of bank privatization. Although the hypotheses were tested for a specific industry,
it would seem reasonable that similar results might also hold for other industries -- fiscal
crises might make privatization of many poorly performing public enterprises more
attractive to politicians.  Understanding the factors that affect the decision to privatize
will allow advocates of privatization to know when pressure can most fruitfully be
applied. 44 In addition to demonstrating the importance of political incentives, this paper
also suggests several policy prescriptions that might encourage the privatization of the
43  World  Bank  (1995),  Chapter  4.
4  On the political  side,  this may argue for a better  understanding  of the support  base  of those policy
makers  that oppose  privatization. If constituents  that elect  legislators  to block privatization  could be won
over,  the process  might  proceed  more  rapidly.
21remaining  publicly  owned  banks in Argentina,  and more generally,  to encourage  the
privatization  of poorly  performing  public  banks in other countries."
Poor bank performance,  and the pressure  this puts on public  finances,  seems  to
have been one of the key variables  that affected  the decision  to privatize. Since  the
rigorous  audits that followed  the decision  to privatize  (and  preceded  the break-up  of the
public  provincial  bank into a privatized  provincial  bank and a residual entity)  often
revealed  that the public  provincial  banks were performing  far worse than  previously
believed,  more  rigorous auditing  of public banks  might increase  pressure  to privatize. 46
More tentatively,  the results also suggest  that moves  that increase  the short-run  cost of
running  banks according  to non-commercial  criteria  might also increase  the likelihood  of
privatization. For example,  tightening  provisioning  requirements  might increase  the cost
of carrying  politically-motivated  high-risk  loans. A further  implication,  for other
countries  considering  bank privatization,  is that investing  money  to improve  publicly
owned  banks prior to privatization  (to make  them more  attractive  to potential  buyers)
might have the unfortunate  side-effect  of reducing  political  pressure  to privatize.
This study also allows  us assess  whether  future  provincial  bank privatizations  in
Argentina  are likely  to be similar  to those already  observed. If the decision  to privatize
were primarily  driven by provincial  politics or were a response  to an exogenous  crisis,
then  the outcomes  of future privatizations  (e.g. the fiscal consequences)  might be quite
similar  to the outcomes  observed  to date. However  we find that the decision  to privatize
was affected  by characteristics  of the provincial  banks,  meaning  that fiture outcomes
might be quite different. Prior to privatization,  most provinces  split  their public
45  Clarke and Cull (1997)  shows  that the  privatized  banks  performed  significantly  better  than the
remaining  public  provincial  banks. We note,  however,  that  privatizing  banks  prior to improving  prudential
regulation  and bank supervision  might  not prove to be wise. See Cull (1997)  for some preliminary
evidence  on this question.
46  This, of course,  assumes  that  provincial  politicians,  and  the public, are unaware  of the bank's true
performance.  If, based  upon privatizations  in other  provinces,  they already suspect  that the bank is
performing  far worse  than its reported  performance  suggests,  more  rigorous  auditing  might  have less
effect.
22provincial  banks into a privatized  bank,  composed  of the best quality assets and matching
liabilities,  and a so-called  residual  entity,  composed  of the poor quality  assets and
remaining  liabilities.  The province  then sold  the bank and retained  the residual entity. A
final  observation  is that, since the worst banks were more likely  to be privatized,  we
would  expect  the observed  size of the residual  entities  to be smaller  in future
privatizations. 4"
47  Clarke  and Cull  (1997) show  the size  of the residual  entity depends  upon  the quality  of the provincial
bank's portfolio  prior to privatization.
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26Appendix  1.  Results  Omitting  Banco de Provincia  de Buenos Aires.
Table 6: Proportional Hazard Model for Bank Privatization (Buenos  Aires Omitted)
(1)  1  (2)  1  (3)  1  (4)  1  (5)
Proportional Hazard Model (Monthly  Data)
Prov. de Buenos Aires Included  No  No  No  No  No
# of Banks  22  22  22  22  16
# ofPrivatizations  16  16  16  16  12
# of Months at Risk of Privatization  950  950  950  950  765
Does  the PJ control  the assembly  -0.410  -0.383  -0.347  -0.034  -1.860
and the executive?  (I=yes,Ono)  (-0.51)  (-0.49)  (-0.44)  (-0.04)  (-1.40)
Can either UCR  or independents  -2.369**  -2.211**  -0.395  -2.109
block? (I=yes,O=:no)  (-2.54)  (-2.55)  (-0.28)  (-1.46)
Can the UCR block in assembly  or  -2.275**
executive?  (I=yes,0=no)  (-2.02)
Can independents  block in assembly  -2.504*
or executive?  (I=yes,0=no)  (-1.88)
Bank net worth  over  liabilities  -15.395**  -15.388**  -16.390**  -16.468**  -12.112*
(lagged)  (-2.53)  (-2.55)  (-2.81)  (-2.76)  (-1.88)
% of bank loans  to public sector  8.622**  8.786**  8.328**  7.964**  1.966
(lagged)  (2.68)  (2.89)  (2.87)  (2.75)  (0.40)
% of bank loans considered  -7.843**  -7.892**  -8.209**  -8.094**  -7.613**
"normal" (either  definition)  (lagged)  (-3.35)  (-3.37)  (-3.48)  (-3.36)  (-2.50)
% of bank loans considered  - 2.986**  2.945**  2.938**  2.891**  3.376*
"normal" (old  definition)  (lagged)  (2.17)  (2.19)  (2.16)  (2.04)  (1.90)
Gov't  deficit  as share of revenues  10.069**  10.157**  10.070**  11.241**  8.656**
(lagged)  (2.79)  (2.85)  (2.82)  (3.03)  (2.35)
Gov't deficit (lagged)  * blocking  -15.964
dummy  (-1.29)
Change in net worth  over  liability  -4.368  -4.323
(lagged)  (-0.58)  (-0.57)
If the governor is a member of the  2.496*
PJ, can he be re-elected?  (1.95)
Log Likelihood  -23.33  -23.34  -23.52  -22.35  -14.56
t-stats  in parentheses.
* indicates  significance  at 10%  level  ** indicates  significance  at 5% level.
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